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Noncitizens’ Remedies Lost?:  
Accountability for Overreaching in Immigration 
Enforcement 
Peter Margulies
*
 
Remedies for government overreaching in immigration cases 
have always embodied a dilemma.  On the one hand, the government 
sometimes acts excessively, failing to provide allegedly removable 
noncitizens with appropriate process,1 using excessive force in arrests,2 
or detaining noncitizens too long or under poor conditions.3  On the 
other hand, particularly since the government has legitimate concerns 
about both immigration violations and the threat of terrorism from 
noncitizens, overly broad or expansive remedies may chill government 
efforts and leave the nation vulnerable.4  While such competing con-
cerns exist in any area involving suits against government officials,5 
                                                                                                                           
 * Professor of Law, Roger Williams University.  I thank participants at the Florida Interna-
tional University School of Law Immigration Law Conference, particularly Ediberto Roman and 
the staff of the Law Review, for conversations that made this Article possible; all mistakes are 
my own.   
 1 See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 576-77 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 
3409 (2010). 
 2 See Argueta v. U.S. Immigrations & Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60 (3d Cir. 2011); cf. 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (permit-
ting suit for damages against federal agents who behaved in abusive and insulting fashion during 
search of residence).   
 3 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (reciting facts but rejecting liability); PETER 
MARGULIES, LAW’S DETOUR: JUSTICE DISPLACED IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 29 (2010); 
DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR ON 
TERROR 30-31 (2007) (discussing the post-9/11 roundup of undocumented noncitizens from 
Middle East and South Asia, most of whom had no ties to terrorism); see also DANIEL 
KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 8-9 (2007).  
 4 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (declining to impose supervisory liability for officials who 
allegedly knew about, but failed to address abusive conditions of confinement).   
 5 Compare George D. Brown, Accountability, Liability, and the War on Terror — Constitu-
tional Tort Suits as Truth and Reconciliation Vehicles, 63 FLA. L. REV. 193, 234-37 (2011) (warn-
ing of unintended effects of tort liability), and Peter H. Schuck, Suing Government Lawyers for 
Giving Dubious Legal Advice in a National Security Crisis: Notes on How (Not) to Become a 
Banana Republic, __ ST. THOMAS L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2011) (on file with author) (critiquing 
suits for damages against officials as chilling exercise of judgment), with Alexander A. Reinert, 
Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and its Consequences for the Individual Liability 
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these concerns are particularly salient in the immigration context.  
This brief paper aims to carve out space where those injured by gov-
ernment overreaching can seek relief, without creating the negative 
externalities that would hamper legitimate enforcement efforts.   
The dilemma parallels the relationship in human inference be-
tween myopia and hindsight bias.  Remedies such as damage suits are 
useful for deterring the myopia that can afflict government officials.6  
Like other human beings, officials tend to have a limited time horizon.  
Events and concerns that are immediate and vivid receive a dispro-
portionate share of attention, while intermediate and long-term ef-
fects fade from view.7  Too often, officials act on short-term concerns, 
with a hasty consideration of techniques that seem expedient or re-
quire less time, without pondering the effectiveness of those tech-
niques.  The groundbreaking case that established law enforcement 
officials’ liability under the United States Constitution involved 
agents forcing their way into a home and humiliating a suspect in 
front of his family.8  The agents never considered whether obtaining a 
warrant or securing the suspect’s consent – both techniques used re-
peatedly – would have been appropriate.  Some of this same heedless-
ness has seeped into immigration enforcement.9       
                                                                                                                           
Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2010) (arguing that suits for damages promote accountability); see 
also Stephen I. Vladeck, Justice Jackson, the Memory of Internment, and the Rule of Law After 
the Bush Administration, in WHEN GOVERNMENTS BREAK THE LAW: THE RULE OF LAW AND 
THE PROSECUTION OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 183, 201-06 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain 
eds., 2010) (discussing risks and benefits of spectrum of sanctions, including suits for damages); 
cf. Peter Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight: Bivens Actions, National Security Decisions, 
and the Rule of Law, 96 IOWA L. REV. 195 (2010) (courts should not categorically preclude or 
allow suits for damages against officials, but instead should analyze whether damage action in 
particular context would encourage alternatives to overreaching). 
 6 See Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight, supra note 5, at 204-11. 
 7 See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 13, 45-46 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 
2000) (people inappropriately discount future costs); Daniel Read, Intertemporal Choice, in 
BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 424, 428-29 (Derek J. Koehler 
& Nigel Harvey eds., 2004) (individuals prefer “smaller-sooner reward,” even when rational 
person would wait longer for significantly larger pay-off); David Laibson, Golden Eggs and 
Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443 (1997) (people employ “commitment mechanisms” 
such as insurance policies or savings plans to correct for tendency to unduly discount the future); 
George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Projection Bias in Predicting Future 
Utility, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1209 (2003) (analyzing errors in discounting over time). 
 8 See also James E. Pfander, The Story of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 275 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith 
Resnik eds., 2010) (discussing background of Bivens case). 
 9 See Douglas v. United States, 796 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (Plaintiff, who had 
obtained derivative citizenship through mother’s naturalization, was needlessly detained for 
more than eight months on immigration charges because when he submitted detailed letter to 
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent regarding his citizenship 
 
2011] Noncitizens’ Remedies Lost? 321 
However, a countervailing value here is hindsight bias.10  Human 
beings often believe that harms are preventable.  In fact, a dense web 
of circumstance often blocks a different result.  Courts review official 
decisions from the cozy recliner of retrospect.  Hindsight bias comes 
with the territory.  Hemmed in by fear of hindsight bias, immigration 
enforcement officials would lose the flexible judgment that decisive 
action requires.  By chilling difficult decisions that serve the public 
interest, excessive liability would trigger substantial opportunity costs.  
Courts have constrained damage suits to forestall this possibility.11 
Courts have generally been more considerate about the dangers 
of hindsight bias than the risks of myopia.  As a result, both Congress 
and the courts have constrained damage suits in a number of ways.  
Congress has written language into the Immigration and Nationality 
Act that could be read to severely restrict damage suits as well as oth-
er litigation.12  Moreover, courts generally require that a plaintiff first 
exhaust administrative remedies.13  In addition, a Bivens action against 
a federal official cannot proceed if courts believe that “special factors 
counsel[] hesitation” in allowing such a suit.14  Even if the plaintiffs 
leap this hurdle, they must overcome the qualified immunity of the 
official, which permits liability only if the official has acted in violation 
of settled law.15  Plaintiffs who are stymied by these requirements may 
                                                                                                                           
status, the agent declined to look into matter and merely said, “Talk to the judge”; the court 
granted summary judgment to Plaintiff on malicious prosecution claim).  
 10 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, in 
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 7, at 95 [hereinafter Rachlinski, Positive The-
ory in Hindsight] (notions such as “hindsight . . . is ‘20/20’” stand for the proposition that 
“[l]earning how the story ends . . . distort[s] our perception of what could have been predicted.”); 
Neal J. Roese, Twisted Pair: Counterfactual Thinking and the Hindsight Bias, in BLACKWELL 
HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING, supra note 7, at 258, 260-61 [hereinafter  
Roese, Twisted Pair] (because of hindsight bias, people “believe that an event was predictable 
before it occurred even though for the perceiver it was not”). 
 11 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982). 
 12 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (2006) (barring “any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien 
arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudi-
cate cases, or execute removal orders . . .”). 
 13 See El Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 579 F. Supp. 2d 249, 273 (D. Conn. 2008). 
 14 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 
(1971); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 576-77 (2d Cir. 
2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010). 
 15 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807; Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011); see also Pearson v. 
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (allowing court to find that official had immunity due to absence of 
clearly settled law without first determining whether plaintiff’s rights were violated); cf. Diana 
Hassel, Excessive Reasonableness, 43 IND. L. REV. 117 (2009) (arguing that Pearson holding 
encouraged undue deference for official decisions); Stephen I. Vladeck, AEDPA, Saucier, and 
the Stronger Case for Rights-First Constitutional Adjudication, 32 SEATTLE U. L. R. 595, 608-12 
(2009) (discussing rationale for Pearson holding); see generally Peter H. Schuck, Suing Our Ser-
vants: The Court, Congress, and the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 
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be able to sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), but there, 
another barrier awaits: the court must find that the challenged deci-
sion did not arise from a “discretionary function” of the agency that 
courts should not second-guess.16   
These barriers are even more formidable in the immigration con-
text.  Courts often extend themselves to defer to officials in damage 
suits involving immigration enforcement.17  This compounds the 
courts’ pervasive deference in the immigration arena.  According to 
precedent, Congress has plenary power over immigration, where it is 
able to impose classifications that would violate equal protection in 
any other realm.18  In addition, Bill of Rights guarantees mean far less 
in the immigration setting.  For example, uncertainty exists regarding 
the First Amendment rights of aliens.19  Laxity also prevails for Fourth 
Amendment rights – a search or seizure must be not only unreason-
able, but egregiously so, to result in exclusion of evidence or sanctions 
against the government.20     
The result of procedural and substantive restraints on suits for 
damages is what I call the specificity two-step.  To perform the speci-
ficity two-step, courts narrowly construe a term or element when that 
                                                                                                                           
281 [hereinafter Schuck, Suing Our Servants] (arguing that failure to curb damages actions leads 
to undue official risk-aversion). 
 16 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006); see United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991) (construing 
exception). 
 17 See Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60 (3d Cir. 2011); see 
generally Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1412-18 
(2009) (analyzing rationale for deference in national security cases). 
 18 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889); 
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).  For critiques of the plenary power doctrine, see 
KANSTROOM , supra note 3, at 113-16; Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Differ-
ence that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1059-60 (1994); Linda Kelly, Preserving the 
Fundamental Right to Family Unity: Championing Notions of Social Contract and Community 
Ties in the Battle of Plenary Power Versus Aliens’ Rights, 41 VILL. L. REV. 725 (1996); see also 
Ediberto Román & Theron Simmons, Membership Denied: Subordination and Subjugation Un-
der United States Expansionism, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 437 (2002) (critiquing judicial deference 
to Congress in administration of territories); see generally GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO 
THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996) (analyzing con-
sequences of territoriality under Constitution); cf. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a 
Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE 
L.J. 545 (1990) (arguing that courts have developed approaches to statutory interpretation to 
mitigate harshness to noncitizens caused by plenary power doctrine). 
 19 See Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667, 715 
(2003) (“Congress may to some extent infringe on the rights on noncitizens in ways that would 
be impermissible if done to citizens.”). 
 20 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 (1984) (O’Connor, J., plurality opin-
ion) (Fourth Amendment exclusionary does not ordinarily apply in removal proceedings, but 
might apply in context of “egregious” violations); Nathan Treadwell, Fugitive Operations and the 
Fourth Amendment: Representing Immigrants Arrested in Warrantless Home Raids, 89 N.C. L. 
REV. 507 (2011). 
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serves government interests, but pivot to a broader construction when 
a narrower approach would hold government accountable.  For exam-
ple, in adjudicating claims that officials did not adequately supervise 
subordinates in immigration enforcement, one court has narrowly 
construed the notice that officials must receive of subordinates’ mis-
conduct.21  Because of this narrow reading, courts view even notice of 
systemic problems as isolated anecdotes that do not trigger liability.  
In contrast, in considering whether an agency sued under the FTCA 
can claim that its acts were a discretionary function, courts have been 
prone to finding that even isolated acts of heedless habit have sys-
temic implications that courts should not second-guess.22  The specific-
ity two-step upsets law’s careful balance between official myopia and 
hindsight bias. 
To counter the specificity two-step, this Article suggests a sliding 
scale test to address Bivens actions for damages against immigration 
officials and the scope of the “discretionary function” exception to 
liability under the FTCA.  Instead of buying into categorical defer-
ence or interventionism, a sliding scale test provides a flexible means 
for easing both myopia and hindsight bias.  Use of a sliding scale has 
significant implications for suits against immigration officials and 
agencies.  A sliding scale approach would narrowly define the “factors 
counseling hesitation” that preclude Bivens actions.  This narrow defi-
nition would allow for more fine-grained analysis of individual cases.  
In suits against supervisors, the sliding scale approach would permit 
liability if an official knew of ongoing violations by subordinates and 
failed to act.  In suits involving an alleged failure by supervisors to 
train subordinates, the sliding scale approach would consider the pre-
employment experience of subordinate officials and the nature of the 
interests affected by enforcement overreaching.  In the qualified im-
munity context, the test would broadly define “clearly established 
law” that overcomes immunity if the official’s actions were egregious, 
and the opportunity costs of a decision for plaintiffs were low.  Simi-
larly, in the FTCA arena, the approach would narrowly define the 
“discretionary function” exception when a decision for plaintiffs in-
volved heedless habits whose modification would not alter policy de-
liberations.    
The Article is in four parts.  Part I discusses the relationship be-
tween remedies for official action and cognitive biases.  Part II dis-
cusses threshold objections to suits for damages, such as exhaustion 
                                                                                                                           
 21 See Argueta, 643 F.3d at 74-75. 
 22 See Castro v. United States, No. C-06-61, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9440, at *32 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 
9, 2007), aff’d, 608 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 902 (2011). 
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and statutory bars to relief.  It concludes that these concerns would 
not preclude most suits.  Part III discusses the present state of the law 
and the specificity two-step, which threatens to sharply narrow relief 
under Bivens and the FTCA for victims of overreaching in immigra-
tion enforcement.  Part IV suggests the sliding scale approach as a 
remedy for the pro-government tilt of the specificity two-step.  
I.  COGNITIVE BIASES AND REMEDIES 
Humans are subject to cognitive biases that distort decisionmak-
ing.23  One bias is myopia, which dwells on short-term outcomes with 
steep discounting of future results.  Another is hindsight bias, which 
makes every official error seem preventable and every official a dunce 
for failing to head off mistakes.  Balancing these biases is both chal-
lenging and necessary in fashioning remedies.   
The Framers appreciated the perils of myopia.  Hamilton com-
mented that legislatures were subject to the “effects of occasional ill 
humors in the society.”24  Since the political branches are fickle, popu-
lar whim or paranoia can lead to excessively volatile government.  
Courts can supply a more extended perspective to curb these “pendu-
lar swings.”25   
Actions for damages also play a significant part in remedies for 
myopia.  Dating back to the Founding Era, courts have awarded mon-
etary relief to individuals injured by official action.26  More recently, in 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcot-
ics,27 the Court held that a victim of an unreasonable search could re-
cover damages.   
Yet myopia is not the only bias relevant to remedies: a counter-
vailing factor is the danger of hindsight bias.  Hindsight bias heightens 
                                                                                                                           
 23 The following account is based on Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight, supra note 5, 
at 204-11. 
 24 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 25 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008). 
 26 See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804) (monetary relief 
ordered for improper seizure of neutral vessel); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 173, 177, 
179 (1804) (damages ordered for seizure of vessel in violation of a statute); The Paquete Habana, 
175 U.S. 677 (1900) (ordering monetary relief for owner of a coastal fishing vessel seized during 
Spanish-American war); see also Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814) (ordering 
relief from official’s attempt during War of 1812 to condemn as enemy property without congres-
sional authorization cargo on a vessel chartered by a British company); Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, 
The President’s Power to Detain “Enemy Combatants”: Modern Lessons from Mr. Madison’s 
Forgotten War, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1567, 1597-1607 (2004) (analyzing Brown). But see Robert 
Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century State 
Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 57, 67-72 (1999) (discussing limits of early decisions 
regarding monetary relief).   
 27 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
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the perceived likelihood that another person could have prevented 
harm.28  In reality, harm often emerges from a confluence of causes.29  
Officials weary of continual second-guessing will often “play it safe,” 
shrinking from tough decisions.  To cope with hindsight bias, courts 
have taken a range of measures.  They have granted officials qualified 
immunity that shields those who have not violated “clearly settled” 
law.30  Even more fundamentally, they have barred lawsuits with fac-
tors, such as national security, that “counsel hesitation” about the ap-
propriateness of a damages remedy.31  The FTCA similarly bars law-
suits concerning the military32 or the formulation of policy.33    
Hindsight bias, like myopia, dovetails with other cognitive flaws 
such as the availability heuristic.34  In the imperfect realm of human 
inference, vivid images affect assessments of probability: an individual 
who recalls a vivid event with its accompanying imagery will exagger-
ate the likelihood of that event’s recurrence, while discounting the 
likelihood of more mundane events.  For example, people exaggerate 
the probability of harm stemming from air travel because the images 
of plane crashes and aviation disasters are so memorable.35  On the 
other hand, most people markedly underestimate the likelihood of 
harm stemming from automobile accidents.  Paradoxically, one reason 
for this lowered estimate is the ordinary nature of car accidents – the-
se mishaps are too pervasive to be remarkable.36  Similarly, a vivid 
harm that has already occurred serves as an “anchor” for assessment 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See Rachlinski, Positive Theory in Hindsight, supra note 10; Roese, Twisted Pair, supra 
note 10, at 258.  
 29 See W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against 
Corporations in Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285, 300 (1998) (juries err in assess-
ing liability for low-probability but high-stakes events).  But see CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS 
ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA 109-12 (2001) (praising practical wisdom and sound moral judgment 
in jury verdicts). 
 30 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 
(2011); Brown, supra note 5; Schuck, Suing Our Servants, supra note 15; cf. Vladeck, supra note 5 
(recommending caution in paring away remedies). 
 31 See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 580 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010). 
 32 See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
 33 See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991) (interpreting FTCA’s “discretionary 
function” exception to liability).   
 34 See Gideon Keren & Karl H. Teigen, Yet Another Look at the Heuristics and Biases 
Approach, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING, supra note 7, at 
89, 97 (noting that vivid risks skew judgments of probability). 
 35 See Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE 
L.J. 61, 62-70 (2002). 
 36 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics, Biases, and Governance, in BLACKWELL 
HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING, supra note 7, at 567, 575-76 [hereinafter 
Rachlinski, Heuristics and Governance]. 
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of the chain of events that failed to prevent that harm.37  With a vivid 
harm as the anchor, viewers typically fault those acts or omissions, 
even when officials acted reasonably based on the information avail-
able to them.  This sentiment, if allowed to proceed unhindered, would 
result in damages judgments that would chill official decisions.  To 
avoid this problem, Congress and the courts have shielded executive 
decisionmaking.  A court will dismiss a suit for damages for violation 
of the Constitution if the court believes that the context of the case 
includes “factors counseling hesitation” such as the possibility of dis-
closure of national security information.38  If a plaintiff leaps this hur-
dle, courts have ruled that officials retain qualified immunity from suit 
unless they have violated “clearly settled” law.39  When a plaintiff sues 
the United States under the FTCA because of alleged official wrong-
doing, Congress has declined to waive the government’s sovereign 
immunity when the decision involves a “discretionary function.”40 
Immigration is in need of curbs on myopia.  Too often, govern-
ment action against immigrants seems driven by the need to demon-
strate that officials are doing something, anything, to deal with per-
ceived threats.41  Moreover, just as for Bivens, the remedy for nonciti-
zen subjects of government overreaching is “damages or nothing.”42  A 
noncitizen who has been victimized by overreaching in immigration 
enforcement often has no remedy because the Supreme Court has 
severely limited the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings.43  
                                                                                                                           
 37 On anchoring, see Daniel Kahneman, Ilana Ritov & David Schkade, Economic Prefer-
ences or Attitude Expressions?: An Analysis of Dollar Responses to Public Issues, in CHOICES, 
VALUES, AND FRAMES, 642, 665-68 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000); Gretchen B. 
Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Anchoring, Activation, and the Construction of Values, 79 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 115, 144 (1999); cf. Rachlinski, Heu-
ristics and Governance, supra note 36, at 569 (noting marked increase in research subjects’ view 
of need to take precautions once researchers told subjects that flood with ten percent probability 
of occurrence in particular year had actually happened).   
 38 See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 576-77 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 
3409 (2010). 
 39 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 
(2011). 
 40 See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991). 
 41 See KANSTROOM, supra note 3, at 147-48 (citing rationale for post-World War I raids 
against suspected noncitizen seditionists ordered by Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer).   
 42 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 
(Harlan, J., concurring); see also Brown, supra note 5, at 851-52 (discussing relationship between 
Harlan’s position and practice of implying private rights of action in statutes). 
 43 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984); cf. Treadwell, supra note 20 (discussing 
abuses in immigration searches); Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and “Aliens”: Privacy Expectations 
and the Immigration Raids, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081 (2008); Katherine Evans, The ICE Storm 
in U.S. Homes: An Urgent Call for Policy Change, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 561 (2009); 
Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the “Law of the Land”: United 
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While the Court in Lopez-Mendoza contended that federal immigra-
tion officials had successfully implemented a “comprehensive scheme 
for deterring Fourth Amendment violations,”44 the Court may have 
been too optimistic.  In the traditional enforcement context of a 
workplace raid, enforcement questioning is often based on behavioral 
cues that can be ambiguous and susceptible to subjective interpreta-
tion.45  A trained agent may well be able to interpret these cues effec-
tively in most circumstances, reducing the risk of false positives – indi-
viduals thought to be undocumented who are actually citizens or legal 
residents.  However, agents are human, and mistakes are likely.  The 
Lopez-Mendoza Court asserted that the immigration enforcement 
authorities had a procedure in place for disciplining errant agents.46  
However, the Court did not disclose how many times and with what 
rate of success this procedure had been used.  In the comparable case 
of errant immigration judges, discipline has historically been lax.47   
That said, immigration cannot entail unduly broad remedies for 
fear of chilling officials dealing with genuine threats.  Remedies 
should not require officials to second-guess themselves continually in 
individual cases despite the caseload pressure created by well over a 
million cases annually.48  The threat of liability for damages could im-
pair the timely processing of those cases or tempt officials to look the 
other way at obvious illegality.  Neither result would serve the public 
interest.   
II.  THRESHOLD BARRIERS: EXHAUSTION AND STATUTORY 
PRECLUSION 
Before exploring obstacles to suits for damages in greater detail, 
it will be useful to deal with threshold barriers to such relief.  These 
barriers include exhaustion and statutory preclusion.  The following 
paragraphs deal with each in turn. 
                                                                                                                           
States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyer-
ing, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005 (2010).  
 44 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1045. 
 45 Id. at 1037 (noting that appellee Sandoval-Sanchez had appeared “evasive” and sought 
to avoid questioning by immigration agent). 
 46 Id.  
 47 For discussions of systemic flaws in decisions by immigration judges, see Michele Bene-
detto, Crisis on the Immigration Bench: An Ethical Perspective, 73 BROOKLYN L. REV. 467 (2008); 
cf. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities 
in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2007); Linda Kelly Hill, Holding the Due Process 
Line for Asylum, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 85 (2007); Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War 
on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369 (2006). 
 48 See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1049; Schuck, Suing Our Servants, supra note 15; Brown, 
supra note 5. 
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A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies   
 
Exhaustion is often a problem with litigation concerning particu-
lar results in administrative proceedings.  When claimants for particu-
lar relief, such as receipt of government benefits, seek recourse in fed-
eral court without first petitioning the agency with primary jurisdic-
tion over their claims, courts typically require claimants to exhaust 
their administrative remedies.49  Exhaustion provides courts with a 
more complete record on which to base their decision.  It also allows 
administrative agencies “first crack” at a case, which enhances agency 
expertise and vindicates Congress’s design in conferring jurisdiction 
on the agency.50  However, exhaustion should not be a problem in 
damages suits over immigration overreaching.  In these cases, the 
claimant is not seeking to litigate a question that the agency decides, 
such as the noncitizen’s removability.51  The noncitizen’s present immi-
gration status is rarely, if ever, at issue in suits for damages.  Instead, 
the claimant is litigating the collateral question of the lawfulness of 
immigration enforcement.52  Because of the limited reach of the exclu-
sionary rule in immigration proceedings, even clear violations will 
rarely affect the noncitizen’s removal.  Such exhaustion should not be 
required.   
B. The REAL ID Act and 1996 Limits on Federal Court Jurisdiction 
 
The next question is whether Congress has barred jurisdiction 
over the claim pursuant to provisions in the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act (INA).  Congress has repeatedly legislated to streamline the 
removal process, believing that judicial review of removal outside of 
specific channels could cause delay and eventually bring the process 
to a halt.53  These provisions guard against a multiplicity of judgments 
on the central issue of a noncitizen’s deportability.  However, these 
provisions do not bar a properly framed damage suit. 
The most important provision is section 1252(g), which bars “any 
cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or 
action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate 
                                                                                                                           
 49 See, e.g., Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) (discussing statutory exhaustion rule in 
prisoner’s rights suits).   
 50 See Marcia R. Gelpe, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Lessons from Environ-
mental Cases, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 10-20 (1985). 
 51 See El Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 579 F. Supp. 2d 249, 273 (D. Conn. 2008) 
(discussing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)). 
 52 Id. 
 53 See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999). 
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cases, or execute removal orders . . . .”54  Section 1252(g) established a 
procedure for judicial review of removal orders in the federal circuit 
courts.55  To limit the impact of hindsight bias, Congress barred review 
of decisions to initiate proceedings or execute deportation orders, rea-
soning that if the government’s effort to remove a noncitizen was 
groundless, the appropriate forum for that determination was a re-
moval proceeding in Immigration Court, subject to statutorily speci-
fied judicial review.56 
However, courts have often interpreted section 1252(g) narrowly.  
The provision itself does not include any mention of suits for dam-
ages.57  Moreover, other claims, such as those involving the length of 
conditions of detention or the circumstances of arrest, are not clearly 
barred by section 1252(g).  Decisions about arrest or detention are 
“separate and discrete” from the commencement of deportation pro-
ceedings.58  This view is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Zadvydas v. Davis,59 in which the Court permitted a constitutional 
and statutory challenge to indefinite detention of noncitizens whom 
the government could not return to their country of origin because 
that country had declined to accept them.  At first blush, Zadvydas 
involved a challenge to the execution of a removal order, or, at the 
very least, to government action pending removal.  However, the Zad-
vydas Court, which upheld the challenge, framed the issue not as exe-
cution of a removal order, but as the constitutionality of detention 
when removal appeared impossible.60  A broad reading of section 
1252(g) would have denied noncitizens access to the courts to test 
their detention, thus triggering constitutional problems.61  Driven in 
part by the need to avoid deciding whether Congress could limit such 
access to the courts, courts have narrowly construed the statute, view-
ing claims of prolonged detention after entry of a removal order as 
involving not execution of a removal order, but “failure to execute a 
                                                                                                                           
 54 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (2006). 
 55 See Gerald L. Neuman, On the Adequacy of Direct Review After the REAL ID Act of 
2005, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133 (2006). 
 56 See Reno, 525 U.S. 471. 
 57 See El Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 579 F. Supp. 2d 249, 265 (D. Conn. 2008). 
 58 Id. at 266. 
 59 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 60 Id. at 688. 
 61 Cf. El Badrawi v. United States, 787 F. Supp. 2d 204, 223 (D. Conn. 2011); see also Cro-
well v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60-61 (1932) (referring to canon that courts should construe statutes 
to avoid constitutional problems); Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 680-
81 (1986) (presumption that statutes does not preclude judicial review); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 
592, 603-05 (1988); cf. Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene’s Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the 
Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107 (2009); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative 
Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 924, 937-38 (1988). 
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removal order.”62  Moreover, as one court noted, a suit for damages 
after completion of a removal proceeding is collateral to that proceed-
ing.  It does not seek to “re-litigate” the removal proceeding and, 
hence, poses no risk of the “deconstruction, fragmentation, and . . . 
prolongation” of proceedings that the Supreme Court believed was 
Congress’s principal concern.63  However, even a narrow reading of 
section 1252(g) will bar a suit for damages where the noncitizen had 
another remedy available that the Immigration and Nationality Act 
specifically authorizes.64 
III.  GUARDING OFFICIAL DISCRETION: BIVENS, THE FTCA, AND 
COURTS’ “SPECIFICITY TWO-STEP”  
Section 1252’s jurisdictional bar is only the beginning of the ob-
stacles plaintiffs face.  Both Bivens actions and suits under the FTCA 
face further limits.  Those limits form a pattern that I call the “specific-
ity two-step.”  In this maneuver, courts read a statutory term or doc-
trinal element narrowly when that construction serves the govern-
ment.  However, courts pivot to a broader reading of other terms 
when that interpretation serves government interests.  The specificity 
                                                                                                                           
 62 El Badrawi, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 267 (emphasis added) (distinguishing Duamutef v. INS, 
386 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
 63 See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 487 (1999); cf. Sameer 
Ahmed, Comment, INA Section 242(g): Immigration Agents, Immunity, and Damages Suits, 119 
YALE L.J. 625 (2009); see also Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Div. of Dep’t 
of Homeland Sec., 510 F.3d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), which 
channels review of claims “arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove” a 
noncitizen, does not bar claims that are independent of or collateral to removal decision; claims 
that noncitizens arrested in factory raid were denied counsel were not collateral to removal 
proceedings, and therefore had to be raised in the first instance in those proceedings). 
 64 See Sissoko v. Rocha, 509 F.3d 947, 949-50 (9th Cir. 2007) (in expedited removal where 
detention was mandatory after entry of a deportation order, alien seeking release could have 
filed habeas petition under section 1252(e)(2)(B), claiming that he had not yet received a hear-
ing on the issue of his deportability); cf. Foster v. Townsley, 243 F.3d 210 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that section 1252(g) barred suit for damages against officials for removal of noncitizen who had 
failed to appear for scheduled hearing and received in absentia removal order); Khorrami v. 
Rolince, 493 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (N.D. Ill. 2007), appeal dismissed, 539 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2008) (hold-
ing that section 1252(g) barred claims for damages based on arrest and detention after start of 
removal proceedings, but did not preclude claims based on interrogation by officials prior to 
start of removal proceedings); see also Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 570 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010) (in case of alien who was detained briefly and then subject to “ex-
traordinary rendition” to Syria, court declined to consider suit for damages because of concern 
that suit would reveal sensitive information, but reserved decision on applicability of section 
1252(g), noting that immigration officials may have undermined alien’s ability to seek alternative 
remedy of habeas by hindering access to attorney and failing to timely serve alien with removal 
order).  But see Medina v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 2d 545, 554 (E.D. Va. 2000) (more expansive 
availability of remedies). 
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two-step upsets law’s careful balance between official myopia and 
judicial second-guessing.   
Recent cases reveal increased resort to the specificity two-step.  
Courts have preserved a broad ambit for official discretion, precluding 
Bivens actions when they find that the need for speedy and secret of-
ficial decisions “counsel[s] . . . hesitation” about remedying wrongs,65 
and barring FTCA suits when an act bears even a tangential relation-
ship to discretionary functions and hence to policy.66  Conversely, 
courts require very specific evidence that officials had notice of facts 
and law that should have tempered official decisions.  In the realm of 
facts, plaintiffs must submit proof that senior officials knew subordi-
nates’ lack of training could cause the misconduct alleged.67  In the 
realm of law, a court may dismiss a suit on qualified immunity grounds 
if case law did not squarely prohibit identical official conduct.68  While 
each element of the specificity two-step sounds plausible in isolation, 
the move makes the government’s advantage the principal touchstone 
of interpretation in suits for damages against officials. 
A. Bivens and Factors Counseling Hesitation 
 
In immigration cases, courts have too readily cited the Bivens 
language barring actions for damages because of “special factors 
counselling hesitation.”69  This trend builds on the courts’ reluctance to 
permit Bivens claims outside of specific, narrowly defined contexts.70  
The broad deference generally accorded to the government on immi-
gration matters71 exacerbates courts’ unwillingness to entertain immi-
gration-related Bivens claims. 
Bivens suits have foundered where they might exacerbate collec-
tive action problems or outrun the judiciary’s institutional compe-
tence.  Collective action problems can occur if claimants use actions 
for damages to hold out against a comprehensive remedial regime in 
                                                                                                                           
 65 See Arar, 585 F.3d at 576-77. 
 66 See Castro v. United States, 608 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 902 
(2011).  
 67 See Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 68 See Labadie v. United States, No. C09-1276 MJP, 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 62909 (W.D. Wash. 
June 14, 2011). 
 69 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 
(1971). 
 70 See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007). 
 71 See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); cf. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. 
Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458 (2009) (discussing interaction 
of President’s use of power delegated by Congress and claims to inherent presidential authority 
over some immigration matters). 
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which Congress has provided for more limited relief.72  Courts have 
also frequently expressed doubts about Bivens actions in the fluid 
realms of national security and foreign affairs where executive branch 
officials’ access to information may exceed the courts’ information-
gathering capabilities.73   
This rationale threatens to extinguish suits for damages in immi-
gration matters, even where official misconduct appears egregious.  
Consider Arar v. Ashcroft,74 in which the court held that “factors coun-
selling hesitation”, such as the diplomatic fallout from embarrassment 
to other nations and the risk of disclosure of state secrets, barred 
claims related to the alleged rendition to Syria of a Canadian national 
arrested during a layover at JFK airport.75  The court admitted that the 
threshold was “remarkably low” for this determination.76  In preclud-
ing a remedy, the court declined to address whether safeguards such as 
those in the Classified Information Procedures Act could have pro-
tected sensitive information.77 
At least one court has echoed Arar in precluding a Bivens rem-
edy for alleged official misconduct with only a slender tie to national 
                                                                                                                           
 72 Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (social security disability claims); cf. Carlson v. 
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19-20 (1980) (holding that availability of remedy under Federal Tort Claims 
Act (FTCA) did not bar Bivens action); Hui v. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. 1845 (2010) (availability of 
remedy under FTCA barred Bivens action against officials of Public Health Service); cf. John F. 
Preis, Constitutional Enforcement by Proxy, 95 VA. L. REV. 1663 (2009) (discussing cases). 
 73 Cf. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 681 (1987) (refusing to authorize remedy for 
victims of LSD experiments in military); see also Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298 (1983) 
(precluding suits for damages by minority service personnel claiming racial discrimination); 
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (barring suits against United States for actions arising 
out of military service); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002) (declining to consider suit 
based on amorphous allegations that United States officials failed to provide plaintiff with in-
formation necessary to reduce impact of government lawbreaking abroad).  For a more categori-
cal ruling against such suits, see Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(precluding suit against President Reagan for alleged “Contra” abuses in Nicaragua); see gener-
ally Chesney, supra note 17 (discussing rationales for judicial deference). 
 74 585 F.3d 559, 580 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010) . 
 75 Id. at 573-76.  Although the plaintiff had no links to terrorism, Syrian officials kept him 
in a cell the length and breadth of a grave and beat him repeatedly.  See Scott Shane, On Torture, 
2 Messages and a High Political Cost, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 2007, at A18 (discussing case); U.S. 
Policy in the Middle East: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 110-131 
(2007) (documenting acknowledgment by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in response to 
Rep. William Delahunt (D-MA), that handling of Arar matter triggered “appropriate” concerns).  
For more on the Arar case and rendition, see MARGULIES, supra note 3, at 73-74; Margaret L. 
Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1333 (2007). 
 76 585 F.3d at 574. 
 77 See Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight, supra note 5, at 224; Richard B. Zabel & 
James J. Benjamin, Jr., In Pursuit of Justice: Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the Federal Courts, 
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (2008), http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Alumni_Affairs/USLS-
pursuit-justice.pdf (analyzing criminal prosecutions involving sensitive information).      
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security policy.78  In El Badrawi v. Department of Homeland Security, 
the court viewed Arar as precluding a Bivens claim by a noncitizen 
against officials who had detained him for unarticulated national secu-
rity reasons.  The officials never formally charged the plaintiff with 
security-related immigration violations, and the court determined that 
the stated basis for the plaintiff’s arrest and detention conflicted with 
applicable agency rules.79  Nevertheless, the court found that the offi-
cials’ mere mention of a national security link barred plaintiff’s Bivens 
claim.80 
B. Supervisory Liability 
Viewed from the vantage point of courts’ broad invocation of na-
tional security concerns to justify preclusion of Bivens claims, courts’ 
handling of supervisory liability claims that survive the initial cut illus-
trates the second phase of the specificity two-step: the turn toward 
narrow definitions.  Balancing the need to curb both official myopia 
and judicial second-guessing is particularly difficult with supervisory 
liability.  Sweeping supervisory liability would make senior officials 
insurers for the wrongs of their subordinates and arguably make sen-
ior officials unduly risk-averse.  Since undue risk-aversion can disserve 
the public as much as risk-prone behavior can, this solution is unwise.  
However, unduly lax standards for supervisors do not check the reck-
less conduct of subordinates.  
Two recent cases, Ashcroft v. Iqbal81 and Connick v. Thompson,82 
suggest that the Supreme Court is veering toward the second extreme.  
In Iqbal, the Supreme Court ruled that senior officials could not be 
held liable for allegedly discriminatory conditions of confinement ex-
perienced by persons detained in the post-9/11 immigration roundup, 
                                                                                                                           
 78 See El Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 579 F. Supp. 2d 249, 263-64 (D. Conn. 2008).  
Declining to fully execute the specificity two-step, the court later awarded relief based on the 
FTCA, asserting that officials had acted in violation of clear policies promulgated by immigra-
tion authorities.  See El Badrawi v. United States, 787 F. Supp. 2d 204 (D. Conn. 2011). 
 79 El Badrawi, 787 F. Supp. at 216-22 (finding that regulations contradicted officials’ asser-
tion that Plaintiff, who had timely applied for an extension of his H-1B worker’s visa, was out of 
status).  The basis, if any, for the officials’ concerns is not clear from the record, although it was 
apparently related to worries that Al Qaeda might use noncitizens in the United States to plot a 
follow-up to the Madrid train bombings.  Id. at 210.  The State Department had earlier executed 
a Certificate of Revocation of the plaintiff’s visa, but the certificate provided that the revocation 
would only become effective once the plaintiff had left the United States.  Id. at 209.  The State 
Department’s action, taken before the Madrid bombings, does not indicate that United States 
authorities considered the plaintiff an imminent threat to national security.    
 80 El Badrawi, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 263-64. 
 81 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 82 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). 
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even if those officials were on notice of the poor conditions.83  For the 
Court, supervisory liability was akin to respondeat superior, even 
though respondeat superior imposes a far higher burden on the plain-
tiff by not requiring that a supervisor have notice of subordinates’ 
misconduct.84 
To curb supervisory liability, the Iqbal Court stated that the 
“plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, 
through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitu-
tion.”85  This language could indicate that the Court will disfavor any 
theory of liability based on tacit conduct by senior officials, including a 
lack of proper supervision.86  At the very least, Iqbal’s requirement 
that plaintiffs plead specific misconduct87 by officials hinders supervi-
sory liability claims, which are often based on omissions.88   
An even more recent case, Connick v. Thompson,89 imposes par-
ticularly onerous restrictions on a type of supervisory liability - liabil-
ity for failure to provide adequate training.  In an opinion by Justice 
Thomas, the Court declined to hold the New Orleans District Attor-
ney liable for repeated failures by prosecutors in a capital case to pro-
duce exculpatory evidence.90  The Court noted that to prevail on a 
claim alleging a failure to train, the plaintiff must show deliberate in-
difference to violations of constitutional rights.91  The Court also re-
quired a substantial quantum of evidence to demonstrate deliberate 
indifference, cautioning that a broader view of liability for failure to 
train would invite the second-guessing of official decisions.92  Gener-
ally, the Court noted, a plaintiff would have to show that defendants 
had notice of a “pattern of similar . . . violations” committed by un-
trained employees.93  Moreover, the Court held that a plaintiff who 
overcame this hurdle would also have to show causation by proving 
                                                                                                                           
 83 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 1948 (emphasis added). 
 86 I took this view in an earlier piece. See Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight, supra 
note 5, at 222-23. However, newer decisions have persuaded me that a narrower interpretation is 
appropriate.  See, e.g., Plair v. City of New York, 789 F. Supp. 2d 459, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting 
that courts have continued to find supervisory liability in the Fourth and Eighth Amendment 
contexts).   
 87 Cf. Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. ILL. REV. 145, 
172-79 (2011) (arguing that Iqbal’s specificity requirement reflected incompletely examined 
assumptions about both existence of discrimination and frequency of frivolous lawsuits). 
 88 See, e.g., Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60 (3d Cir. 
2011) (failure to train immigration officers). 
 89 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). 
 90 Id. at 1366. 
 91 Id. at 1358-60. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 1360. 
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that the inadequate training gave rise to the challenged conduct of 
subordinates.94  Ruling that the plaintiff had not met his burden of 
showing deliberate indifference, the Court held that the defendant 
could reasonably assume that lawyers working under him had learned 
in law school about the importance of disclosing exculpatory evi-
dence.95  Based on this stirring confidence in the efficacy of legal edu-
cation, the Court distinguished a prior decision involving alleged vio-
lations of constitutional rights by police officers with no formal legal 
training.96 
A recent Third Circuit case, Argueta v. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement,97 applies this restrictive approach to damages claims that 
arose from August 2006 to April 2008 based on the immigration en-
forcement program Operation Return to Sender (ORTS).98  ORTS 
was an aggressive program that sought to locate, arrest, and remove 
individuals who had failed to comply with deportation orders.99  The 
agency’s stated objectives reflected legitimate enforcement priorities.  
However, the implementation of those priorities apparently caused a 
number of serious problems.  While senior officials from Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) acknowledged that ICE agents 
needed consent from occupants to search residences,100 the Argueta 
plaintiffs alleged that agents had repeatedly failed to obtain occu-
pants’ consent.101  Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that agents had 
behaved in an intimidating and deceptive manner by surrounding resi-
dences in early-morning hours, working with local police officers to 
conceal their official affiliation, pounding on doors and windows until 
frightened occupants allowed them to enter, and treating occupants 
(including children) with a lack of respect.102  Citing Iqbal,103 the court 
held that plaintiffs had failed to plausibly allege that ICE senior offi-
cials had notice of these claimed violations.104   
The Argueta court’s analysis was both artificially narrow and in-
complete.  The court rigidly defined reasonable notice of the risk of 
overreaching, excluding reports of violations in implementation of 
                                                                                                                           
 94 Id. at 1358. 
 95 Id. at 1361. 
 96 Id. at 1361-62 (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989); Bd. of Commis-
sioners, Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997)). 
 97 643 F.3d 60 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 98 Id. at 62. 
 99 Id.; see Bill Ong Hing, Institutional Racism, ICE Raids, and Immigration Reform, 44 
U.S.F. L. REV. 307, 331 (2009).   
 100 Argueta, 643 F.3d at 75. 
 101 Id. at 64-65. 
 102 Id.; see Aldana, supra note 43; Evans, supra note 43; Treadwell, supra note 20.   
 103 Argueta, 643 F.3d at 67-75. 
 104 Id. at 74-75. 
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ORTS from another state.105  Since ICE employees have roughly 
equivalent qualifications throughout the country, a senior federal offi-
cial administering a nationwide initiative should view problems in one 
district as indications of trouble elsewhere.106 
The Argueta court, although it did not cite Connick, also adopted 
the latter case’s casual approach to appropriate training.  Conceding 
that some officers had not completed a three-week training course,107 
the court did not view lack of specific training as a warning sign.  It 
was sufficient, the court explained, that all officers completed “some 
form of basic law enforcement training . . . which presumably would 
have covered basic principles governing . . . the entry into a private 
residence without a judicial warrant.”108  The Third Circuit’s confidence 
seemed misplaced, paralleling the Supreme Court’s blind faith in legal 
education.     
Argueta, together with Supreme Court cases like Connick and 
Iqbal, takes a counterproductive view of the function and responsibil-
ity of senior officials.  Indeed, the Third Circuit’s stress on the senior 
status of officials109 turns tort theory on its head.  Senior officials are 
the quintessential “cheapest cost avoiders” under Calabresi’s classic 
formulation: They can readily obtain information on costs stemming 
from subordinates’ wrongful conduct and change practices to reduce 
                                                                                                                           
 105 Id. 
 106 The court’s assertion that some of the reports and lawsuits relied on by plaintiffs post-
dated the New Jersey raids, id. at 74-75, glided over at least one important counter-example.  One 
lawsuit, Mancha v. U.S. Immigrations & Customs Enforcement, No. 1:06-CV-2650-TWT, 2009 
U.S. Dist. Lexis 27620 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2009), arose from alleged events that occurred in Sep-
tember, 2006, near the beginning of the time-span of the conduct alleged in Argueta.  In Mancha, 
a fifteen-year-old United States citizen was at home getting ready for school when ICE agents 
appeared looking for her mother, who was also a citizen, and engaged in intimidating behavior.  
See id. at *11-13 (declining to dismiss FTCA claims).  Mancha stemmed from an enforcement 
action targeting employees at a poultry plant and apparently did not involve ORTS.  Id. at *2-3.  
However, the egregious facts of the case, in which several ICE agents entered the home of a 
United States citizen, should arguably have been a red flag for senior officials.  The case received 
nationwide publicity.  See Jenny Jarvie, Five Georgians Say They Were Caught Up in Raids for 
Illegal Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2006, at A10; cf. Problems with ICE Interrogation, Deten-
tion, and Removal Procedures: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, 
Border Security, and International Law of the H.R. Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. 34-36 (Feb. 13, 
2008) (including Marie Mancha’s testimony); Arias v. U.S. Immigrations & Customs Enforce-
ment, No. 07-1959, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 34072 (D. Minn. Apr. 23, 2008); Arias v. U.S. Immigra-
tions & Customs Enforcement, No. 07-1959, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 61519 (D. Minn. July 17, 2009) 
(awarding summary judgment for senior officials on qualified immunity grounds in case involv-
ing overly aggressive conduct by subordinates during enforcement action; facts also supported 
view that senior officials lacked reasonable notice that such alleged abuses would occur). 
 107 Argueta, 643 F.3d at 75; see Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1361 (2011). 
 108 Argueta, 643 F.3d at 75. 
 109 Id. 
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costs.110  While senior officials cannot prevent the isolated wrongs of 
subordinates, legal norms should encourage diligent inquiry about the 
risks and benefits of action.  An artificially narrow view of notice 
merely encourages senior officials’ myopia. 
C. Qualified Immunity 
The specificity two-step recurs in qualified immunity cases.  To 
overcome the government’s assertion of immunity, the plaintiff must 
show that the official acted in disregard of “clearly established” law.111  
Increasingly, courts have viewed “clearly established law” narrowly, 
insisting on precedents that precisely match the fact pattern in the 
case at bar.   
As in other settings, legitimate concerns about hindsight bias 
drive the courts.112  Consider Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,113 where the Supreme 
Court held that detention of a material witness in a terrorism investi-
gation for the mixed purpose of preserving the witness’s testimony 
and probing the witness’s own role was not a violation of settled law.114  
In ruling this way, the Court implicitly recognized that authorities, par-
ticularly early in an investigation, will not always be able to distinguish 
between those with information about a conspiracy and the conspira-
tors themselves.  Forcing the government to make a mechanical dis-
tinction, or one based on incomplete information, would be a classic 
example of hindsight bias.  The Court viewed the Ninth Circuit as fal-
ling into the hindsight bias trap when the appellate court found a vio-
lation of clearly established law based merely on the “history and pur-
pose of the Fourth Amendment.”115  Justice Scalia, writing for the 
Court, noted that this nebulous test was pitched at an overly “high 
level of generality.”116  Qualified immunity would have little meaning if 
officials had to guess at the result of such an amorphous test.   
                                                                                                                           
 110 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and In-
alienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1118 (1972); cf. Erin Ryan, Feder-
alism at the Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability Rules in Tenth Amend-
ment Infrastructure, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 16 (2010) (explaining Calabresi and Melamed’s argu-
ment). 
 111 See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011). 
 112 Cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (requiring specific pleading and limiting 
supervisory liability). 
 113 al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074.  
 114 Id. at 2083-85.  Indeed, the Court held that the challenged practice did not violate the 
plaintiff’s rights. Id. at 2080-83. In a concurrence, Justice Kennedy suggested that detaining a 
material witness when officials could readily preserve the witness’s testimony with a deposition 
might violate the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 2085-86 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 115 Id. at 2084 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987)). 
 116 Id. 
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Al-Kidd, however, did not deter lower courts from going to the 
other extreme and requiring undue specificity in precedents.  Since 
facts always vary to some degree, a mechanical insistence that the 
facts in precedents precisely align with facts in a case at issue allows 
most official defendants to argue that no precedent prohibited their 
particular conduct.117  Officials aware of this test ex ante have no incen-
tive to avoid the temptations of short-term thinking.   
Consider here the recent case of Labadie v. United States,118 in 
which Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) agents at a Canadian border 
crossing physically subdued a noncitizen who had simply asked why 
he was being returned to Canada.119  The court held that qualified im-
munity barred the plaintiff’s claim for damages based on a violation of 
the First Amendment.  The court asserted that noncitizens’ rights to 
free speech were not “clearly established” at the time of the alleged 
assault and that qualified immunity therefore protected the agent.120  
While the First Amendment rights of noncitizens are unsettled in 
some respects,121 it seems hard to imagine that an agent has the power 
to physically assault a noncitizen - or anyone else for that matter - 
who merely asks a question.122  Requiring chapter and verse in existing 
precedent merely incentivizes reckless behavior.     
D. The FTCA and the Expanding Discretionary Function Exception 
The “discretionary function” exception of the FTCA123 completes 
the specificity two-step that shields officials.  This exception applies 
when the government action involves “an element of judgment or 
choice,” and the choice “is the kind that the discretionary function 
exception was designed to shield.”124  While courts construing the ex-
ception rightly accord some deference to official decisions, too many 
courts have interpreted the exception with sweeping breadth, discern-
ing policy in officials’ recklessness, indifference, or heedless habit.   
                                                                                                                           
 117 Id.  
 118 Labadie v. United States, No. C09-1276 MJP, 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 39527 (W.D. Wash. 
Apr. 12, 2011). 
 119 The plaintiff alleged that one of the Border Patrol agents involved in the episode “held 
his neck and punched him in the face.”  See Labadie v. United States, No. C09-1276, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. Lexis 62909, at *2 (W.D. Wash. June 14, 2011) (dismissing FTCA claims against individual 
agents, since FTCA only permits suits against United States).   
 120 Labadie, 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 39527, at *10-11. 
 121 See Bosniak, supra note 18. 
 122 The court denied several defendants’ motions for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ 
claims of excessive force and unlawful arrest.  Labadie, 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 39527, at *19-27. 
 123 Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006). 
 124 United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322-23 (1991). 
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The Supreme Court set the tone early in Dalehite v. United 
States,125 holding that the discretionary function exception shielded 
government recklessness in packing and storing fertilizer that the gov-
ernment planned to ship overseas.  A cargo of fertilizer that had been 
kept at an overly high temperature exploded, killing 560 people, 
wounding thousands, and destroying shipping facilities at a Texas 
town.126  Despite abundant evidence that officials knew the risks of 
storing the fertilizer at high temperatures127 and failed to take protec-
tive measures or warn workers of the risks of explosion,128 the Court 
ruled that officials could invoke the exception to liability.129  Indeed, 
the Court viewed officials’ manifest recklessness as supporting the 
argument that the exception applied.  According to the Court, officials 
exercised discretion by deciding that protective measures such as giv-
ing the fertilizer more time to cool prior to packaging would have 
raised the costs of the program, which supplied fertilizer to countries 
such as South Korea.130  Ironically, the fertilizer explosion hindered 
officials’ stated goals by reducing the number of qualified workers and 
destroying shipping capacity.  Official indifference to this foreseeable 
risk was not a policy decision worthy of respect, but a predilection for 
Russian roulette that the law should deter.      
At least one recent appellate decision in the immigration context 
shows the folly of an overly broad definition of policy content under 
the FTCA.  In Castro v. United States,131 the court ruled that the discre-
tionary function exception shielded Border Patrol agents who de-
ported a United States citizen child along with her noncitizen father, 
despite pleas from the child’s citizen mother to allow the child to re-
main in this country in her custody.132  To prevent this train wreck, the 
Border Patrol needed no power of clairvoyance or cornucopia of re-
                                                                                                                           
 125 346 U.S. 15, 35-6 (1953). 
 126 Id. at 48 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 127 Id. at 39-41. 
 128 Id. at 55 (Jackson, J., dissenting).   
 129 Id. at 41-42. 
 130 Id. at 40-41. 
 131 608 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 902 (2011). 
 132 Id. at 269-70.  The mother had sought an emergency modification of custody which a 
family court would probably have approved.  Castro v. United States, 560 F.3d 381, 385 (5th Cir. 
2009).  In custody decisions, the governing standard is the “best interests of the child.”  While 
immigration status should not be the sole determinant of custody, it can be one of the factors 
considered by the court.  See Rico v. Rodriguez, 120 P.3d 812 (Nev. 2005); cf. David B. Thronson, 
Custody and Contradictions: Exploring Immigration Law as Federal Family Law in the Context 
of Child Custody, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 453, 509-10 (2008) (discussing Castro case and suggesting 
that ICE, in permitting noncitizen father to take along citizen child upon his removal, “deter-
mined [custody] without process and without any consideration of the interests of the child”).  In 
Castro, the United States citizen mother eventually received custody and the daughter returned 
to the United States, but this process took another three years. 
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sources.  Officials need only have detained the noncitizen father for a 
couple of days instead of removing him immediately.  Rather than 
encourage this common-sense result, the court took a sweeping view 
of the policy content in the Border Patrol’s conduct.  According to the 
court, detaining the father for even a couple of days would have re-
sulted in increased cost to the government.133  It therefore entailed a 
policy choice that fit within the discretionary function exception.134  
The court did not consider that such split-custody cases are thankfully 
rare in immigration law, thus limiting the drain on government budg-
ets.  The result in Castro did not protect the Border Patrol from hind-
sight bias.  It merely cloaked heedless routine in the mantle of policy. 
IV.  THE SLIDING SCALE APPROACH AND THE RETURN TO COMMON 
SENSE REMEDIES  
Fortunately, case law also demonstrates an alternative to the 
specificity two-step.  The sliding scale approach rejects the categorical 
deference of the specificity two-step, substituting a more granular 
analysis of the opportunity costs that a remedy would yield.  In reject-
ing categorical deference, a sliding scale approach would narrow the 
“factors counseling hesitation” that preclude Bivens actions; officials 
would have to do more than slap a “national security” label on prob-
lematic decisions.  Similarly, a sliding scale approach would not bar 
suits based on supervisory liability.  In cases against supervisors for 
failure to train subordinates, the sliding scale approach would consider 
subordinates’ pre-employment experience and the nature of the inter-
ests affected.  In the qualified immunity context, the test would con-
sider whether liability would unduly chill official decisions.  When a 
challenged action is so egregious that it is fundamentally different in 
kind from the broad range of acceptable decisions, courts should 
broadly define “clearly established law.”  In the FTCA arena, courts 
should narrowly define the “discretionary function” exception to ex-
clude official action that results from heedlessness or habit.   
Sliding scales are common in law.  For example, preliminary in-
junctions balance the prevention of irreparable harm against hardship 
to the other party and the movant’s ultimate likelihood of success on 
the merits.135  Tort liability balances the probability and gravity of an 
                                                                                                                           
 133 See Castro v. United States, No. C-06-61, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9440, at *32 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 
9, 2007), aff’d, 608 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 134 Id. at *31-33. 
 135 See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008); cf. Richard R.W. Brooks & 
Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Uncertainty, Economic Efficiency, and the Preliminary Injunction 
Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 381 (2005) (modeling approach to remedies).  But see Jared A. Gold-
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event: the more serious the possible harm, the lower the probability 
will be of the event’s occurrence.136  In procedural due process, the 
court will balance the significance of individual and state interests 
against the likelihood of error.137  The sliding scale here is an extension 
of that approach.   
Moreover, courts have often tempered categorical limits on ac-
cess to courts with escape hatches that allow relief where the conduct 
challenged is sufficiently egregious.  In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee,138 the Court left open the possibility of ju-
dicial review when a noncitizen contesting removal alleged selective 
enforcement that amounted to “outrageous” discrimination.  In INS v. 
Lopez-Mendoza,139 the Court said that the exclusionary rule might be 
an appropriate remedy for “egregious” violations of liberty and fair-
ness in immigration enforcement.140  Finally, the Court in qualified im-
munity cases has warned against undue rigidity in determining 
whether egregious official actions violated “clearly established” law.141  
In the following sections, I discuss how to apply this sliding scale ap-
proach to factors “counselling hesitation” under Bivens, along with 
qualified immunity, supervisory liability, and the discretionary func-
tion exception to the FTCA.        
A. The Sliding Scale and Availability of Bivens Actions 
A sliding scale approach would check courts’ tendency to cate-
gorically preclude Bivens actions when officials allege a national secu-
rity connection.  As I have discussed in an earlier piece,142 categorical 
deference sends the wrong signal to officials.  A more nuanced ap-
                                                                                                                           
stein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 VA. L. REV. 485 (2010) (critiquing balancing 
test as unduly subjective and amorphous). 
 136 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
 137 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see also Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 
2507 (2011) (applying Mathews formula to reject categorical due process right to counsel for 
indigent parents facing civil contempt for failure to pay child support, while imposing other 
procedural safeguards); cf. Linda Kelly Hill, The Right to be Heard: Voicing the Due Process 
Right to Counsel for Unaccompanied Alien Children, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 41 (2011) (argu-
ing that due process formula requires counsel for alien children abandoned by their parents, who 
otherwise risk inappropriate detention).  
 138 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999). 
 139 468 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 (1984). 
 140 See Anonymous, Immigr. Ct., Exec. Office Immigr. Rev., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (N.Y. Co. 
July 1, 2011) (on file with the author) (Ferris, Immigr. Judge) (suppressing evidence and dismiss-
ing removal proceeding based on egregious search that included agents forcing their way into 
noncitizen’s home); see also Treadwell, supra note 20 (discussing need for Fourth Amendment 
remedies in removal cases).   
 141 See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002). 
 142 See Margulies, Judging Myopia, supra note 5. 
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proach will be more effective in curbing both myopia and hindsight 
bias.    
A re-thinking of Bivens remedies would permit a suit when the 
agency needed a prod toward innovation.  If a plaintiff shows that a 
violation is egregious, as in the extraordinary rendition of Maher Arar 
to Syria or the failure to follow the agency’s own rules in Badrawi, the 
burden should shift to the official to demonstrate that the official has 
treated other like cases in a lawful manner.143  Making this showing 
would cast the violation at issue as an isolated occurrence where a 
remedy will not improve official performance.  However, the recent 
rash of lawsuits about immigration searches, arrests, and detention 
conditions suggests that officials will not be able to meet this stan-
dard.144  Moreover, Bivens remedies have traditionally been available 
for violations involving searches145 and conditions of confinement.146  At 
least in the broad run of immigration cases, no other factors suggest 
the need for caution.   
Similarly, an official should not be able to use the “factors coun-
seling hesitation” prong of Bivens to insulate conduct by slapping a 
“national security” label on a challenged decision.  Recall Badrawi, 
where immigration officials invoked unsupported national security 
concerns to justify disregarding clear guidelines on the legal status of 
noncitizens on temporary employment visas.147  Rather than follow 
agency rules, the immigration officials in Badrawi in effect made their 
own law.148  Under a sliding scale approach, the responsible agents 
would have been obliged to consider alternatives, such as seeking a 
warrant to conduct surveillance on Badrawi at his workplace or using 
other investigative techniques that did not require a warrant.  The op-
portunity costs of this approach would have been low.  A different 
calculus would have applied if Badrawi had been likely to abandon his 
job and go underground to complete a terrorist plot.  However, Bad-
rawi’s request for an extension of his H-1B visa indicated that he 
wished to keep his position.149  Badrawi’s consistent pattern of coop-
eration with immigration authorities could have been an elaborate 
ruse.  However, viewing a pattern of cooperation as evidence of un-
trustworthiness recalls the stereotypes that infected the government’s 
                                                                                                                           
 143 See El Badrawi v. United States, 787 F. Supp. 2d 204 (D. Conn. 2011). 
 144 See, e.g., Argueta v. U.S. Immigrations & Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60 (3d Cir. 
2011) (alleging excesses during search). 
 145 See Pfander, supra note 8. 
 146 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19-20 (1980). 
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 149 Id. at 209-10. 
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assessment of Japanese-Americans during World War II.150  Treating 
both cooperation and defiance as evidence of untrustworthiness 
smacks of “heads I win, tails you lose.”  Obliging officials to abandon 
such stereotypes is not an opportunity cost that should trigger defer-
ence.     
B. Supervisory Liability and Failure to Train 
In the supervisory liability context, courts should similarly reject 
a categorical approach and narrowly interpret the two precedents in 
this area, Iqbal and Connick.  Iqbal should be read as preserving su-
pervisory liability when the supervisor has the state of mind necessary 
to prove the underlying constitutional violation.  Connick should be 
read as permitting failure to train cases to proceed under a sliding 
scale approach with two interactive variables: 1) the pre-employment 
experience of subordinate personnel, and 2) the nature of the interests 
violated.  
1. Intent Not Required 
A threshold question here is whether Iqbal categorically bars 
claims based on supervisory liability.  A categorical approach would 
clash with the sliding scale approach recommended here.  Fortunately, 
a more tempered reading of Iqbal is plausible.  On this view, Iqbal 
only bars claims based on supervisory liability where the plaintiff has 
not plausibly pleaded151 that the supervisor has the state of mind re-
quired for the underlying constitutional violation.  The violations of 
equal protection at issue in Iqbal required proof of discriminatory 
intent.152  However, a plaintiff need not show intent to prove that offi-
cials violated other constitutional provisions.  
When the underlying violation, as in the Fourth Amendment 
arena, does not require intent, Iqbal should not bar the claim.  For 
example, in Argueta v. ICE,153 plaintiffs alleged that ICE agents, acting 
on orders from superiors and without adequate training, had violated 
the Fourth Amendment by entering homes without the consent of 
occupants, verbally abusing those inside, and manhandling children.  
                                                                                                                           
 150 ERIC L. MULLER, AMERICAN INQUISITION: THE HUNT FOR JAPANESE AMERICAN 
DISLOYALTY IN WORLD WAR II 16-18 (2007) (analyzing government stereotypes of Japanese-
Americans); Joseph Margulies, Evaluating Crisis Government, 40 CRIM. L. BULLETIN 627, 638-39 
(2004) (discussing other World War II measures singling out Asian-Americans and Pacific is-
landers). 
 151 See A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431 (2008); Sherry, supra 
note 87. 
 152 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948-49. 
 153 Argueta v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 64 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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The district court held that proof of the officials’ knowledge of these 
practices was sufficient in the Fourth Amendment context.154  The 
Third Circuit expressly reserved this issue.155 
2. Failure to Train, Experience, and the Nature of Underlying 
Interests 
This still leaves the question of liability for failure to train subor-
dinates.  The Court’s decisions in Iqbal¸ Connick v. Thompson, and 
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd suggest the need for limits on actions based on 
failure to train.156  However, these actions remain viable, using a sliding 
scale approach that considers the pre-employment experience of the 
subordinates and the nature of the interest allegedly violated.  
Suppose that subordinate personnel, instead of having a law 
school degree like the subordinates in Connick, have little or no pre-
employment legal training.157  Since problems with compliance would 
be even more foreseeable in this context, a reasonable supervisor 
should take greater precautions.  The case for training would be even 
stronger if the enforcement measure involved a sensitive area where 
immigration authorities have historically been reticent, such as the 
home.   
Viewed with a sliding scale approach, consider the facts alleged in 
Diaz-Bernal v. Myers.158  According to the plaintiffs, in an early-
morning raid in June 2007, ICE personnel entered homes without 
warrants and arrested individuals without probable cause.159  ICE offi-
cials also detained the plaintiffs without knowing their immigration 
status and failed to inform the plaintiffs of their rights.160  Each person 
was detained for 3 to 27 days before being released.161 
Factors that support the liability of senior officials in Diaz-Bernal 
include the modest amount of legal training provided to subordinates; 
reports from other districts of problems with similar measures;162 and 
                                                                                                                           
 154 Argueta v. U.S. Immigrations & Customs Enforcement, No. 08-1652, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
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 157 Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1361-63 (2011). 
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the operation’s focus on residences, where overzealous enforcement 
could also impair privacy interests and affect children who might be 
United States citizens.163  Moreover, perhaps because of the greater 
privacy protections that attach in an individual’s home, immigration 
enforcement actions have historically centered on other sites.164  New 
programs are more prone to error, requiring more attention by senior 
officials.  The failure to provide this attention suggests an absence of 
deliberation that accountability should remedy.  In addition, while the 
Third Circuit questioned in Argueta whether reports from other dis-
tricts could be appropriate notice of potential problems,165 discounting 
such reports should be evidence of senior officials’ lack of due dili-
gence.  Federal programs should be replicable across the country.  Of-
ficials becoming aware of such reports should investigate further to 
eliminate systemic causes rather than assume that “bad apples” caused 
the problems.  If an investigation revealed evidence of systemic prob-
lems, senior officials should modify the training provided or the pro-
gram itself.  A more deferential judicial stance merely encourages sen-
ior officials’ heedlessness.     
C. Qualified Immunity  
The sliding scale approach to qualified immunity would consider 
two factors: the egregiousness of the official action and the specificity 
of precedent.  When conduct is egregious, a plaintiff can invoke even 
general precedents as “clearly established” law.166  This balance ex-
plains decisions that appear inconsistent under the present test, which 
asks only whether the challenged action has violated settled prece-
dents. 
A sliding scale approach would best curb both myopia and hind-
sight bias.  It would not consign plaintiffs to the often impossible mis-
sion of finding precedents that exactly matched the facts alleged.  On 
the other hand, a sliding scale approach would stabilize the opportu-
nity costs of a decision against officials.   
To see how a sliding scale would work in the qualified immunity 
context, consider Hope v. Pelzer,167 in which the Court ruled that 
                                                                                                                           
 163 See Aldana, supra note 43; Treadwell, supra note 20. 
 164 See Hing, supra note 99. 
 165 See Argueta v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 74-75 (3d Cir. 
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 167 536 U.S. 730 (2002). 
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clearly established law barred officials from tying the plaintiff, a state 
prison inmate, to a hitching post in the hot sun for seven hours.  The 
Court ruled that clearly established law barred this practice even in 
the absence of a judicial decision that squarely addressed the particu-
lar facts at issue.168  According to the Court, the Fifth Circuit had taken 
an unduly “rigid” approach by requiring prior precedent that ex-
pressly prohibited such conduct.169  Justice Souter, writing for the 
Court, noted that qualified immunity does not require such a pains-
taking match.170  Instead, the Court viewed precedent more broadly as 
establishing that once officials have secured an inmate’s compliance 
with rules, punishment for past rule infractions should not endanger 
an inmate’s physical health.171  Viewed in this light, overcoming quali-
fied immunity in Hope did not increase opportunity costs.  After the 
decision, an official might avoid a swath of conduct wider than the 
precise conduct at issue.  For example, instead of merely refraining 
from chaining a prisoner to a hitching post for seven hours, a reason-
able official would probably avoid even a six hour stint.  However, this 
reluctance would not compromise valid prison administration con-
cerns.172      
Such an approach would have yielded a different approach in 
Labadie v. United States,173 in which a Canadian national seeking to 
enter the United States alleged that a Border Patrol agent had re-
sorted to using force in response to a polite question.  Instead of look-
ing in a mechanical way at the lack of clear case law on entering non-
citizens’ First Amendment rights, a court would consider whether 
permitting such a lawsuit to proceed to discovery would yield substan-
                                                                                                                           
 168 Id. at 740-41; see also United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997) (noting that child 
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tial opportunity costs.  If permitting the lawsuit would chill effective 
border control, the court would hold that qualified immunity required 
dismissal.  However, permitting discovery would likely not chill en-
forcement if courts also required an entering noncitizen to plead plau-
sibly that he or she had behaved in a respectful manner.   
Refining qualified immunity doctrine in this fashion would en-
courage greater official diligence and promote efficient dispute reso-
lution.  Agents would have an incentive to promptly document occa-
sions when they deemed it necessary to use force.  In considering 
whether the officer’s response was egregious or tailored to the situa-
tion, a court could also consider any past episodes that might have 
heightened the officer’s concern.174  Officials would develop a more 
nuanced institutional memory to inform their conduct, heading off 
incidents before they happen.  When litigation does result, informa-
tion that clarified issues would be available to both the court and op-
posing parties, enhancing the prospects of a quick settlement.175  A slid-
ing scale approach would have positive systemic effects, without the 
opportunity costs that qualified immunity doctrine has sought to re-
duce.  
D. The FTCA and the Appropriate Scope of Discretionary  
Functions 
A sliding scale would also make sense in the FTCA context, tem-
pering the deference that has too often distorted development of the 
“discretionary function” exception to liability.  When opportunity 
costs are low, courts should require a closer nexus between the chal-
lenged action and the management of policy.   
A first category of FTCA claims involves violations of clear con-
stitutional or statutory rights.  Where the law is clear, there is no dis-
cretion.  Thus, even senior officials’ acts would not be covered by the 
exception if those acts entailed blinking at clear unconstitutional con-
duct,176 such as entering residences without a warrant or consent.  Simi-
larly, a decision hinging on a patently erroneous interpretation of a 
                                                                                                                           
 174 Id. at *2-3 (discussing past physical altercation between plaintiff and one of the Border 
Patrol agents named as a defendant in the instant case).   
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discretionary if it violates the Constitution, a statute, or an applicable regulation. Federal officials 
do not possess discretion to violate constitutional rights or federal statutes”). 
348 FIU Law Review [6:319 
federal statute or rule would not involve “judgment or choice” within 
the meaning of the exception.177   
A sliding scale approach would have led to a different result in 
Castro v. United States,178 in which the court held that the discretionary 
function exception applied to Border Patrol agents who deported a 
United States citizen child along with her noncitizen father.  The Bor-
der Patrol ignored a request from the child’s citizen mother to allow 
the child to stay.  The agents’ choice was appropriate only if one ac-
cepts the premise that the Border Patrol had to remove the father 
immediately.  However, the agents would not have impaired immigra-
tion enforcement if they had detained the father for a few days to al-
low Castro to obtain a custody order.  Only a handful of cases involve 
a choice in custody of a citizen child between a citizen parent and an 
undocumented parent.  Detaining a handful of noncitizens for the 
brief period necessary for an emergency custody hearing would not 
raise costs overall.  Given such low opportunity costs, the sliding scale 
approach would have found the discretionary function exception in-
applicable.179   
V.  CONCLUSION 
Remedies for alleged overreaching in immigration enforcement 
create a dilemma.  Unduly sparse remedies promote official myopia.  
Overly plentiful remedies encourage hindsight bias and chill official 
discretion.  With the specificity two-step, courts have avoided the sec-
                                                                                                                           
 177 United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322-23 (1991).  The FTC also waives sovereign 
immunity for claims of false arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and other tradi-
tional torts arising out of law enforcement activities.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).  In El Badrawi v. 
United States, 787 F. Supp. 2d 204 (D. Conn. 2011)., the court granted summary judgment to the 
plaintiff on his false arrest claim, rightly declining to defer to regional immigration officials’ ad 
hoc rewriting of a federal regulation.  Officials had taken the view that a noncitizen was not 
lawfully present in the United States when the noncitizen had complied with a regulation that 
granted an extension of authorized employment for H-1B visa-holders who filed a timely request 
for an extension of their visa status.  See id. at 217 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(b)(20)).  According 
to the court, the regulation clearly extended the noncitizen’s period of lawful presence since no 
reasonable drafter could have contemplated that a noncitizen on an employment visa be author-
ized to work yet not be lawfully present.  Because immigration officials’ decision to arrest the 
plaintiff rested on this indefensible ground, the court found for the plaintiff on his false arrest 
claim.  Id. at 216-224; cf. Douglas v. United States, 796 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1366 (M.D. Fla. 2011) 
(granting summary judgment on malicious prosecution claim where plaintiff was detained be-
cause ICE agent ignored detailed letter regarding his citizenship status). 
 178 Castro v. United States, 608 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 902 (2011). 
 179 For a case where application of the exception was appropriate, consider Rodriguez v. 
United States, 415 Fed. Appx. 143 (11th Cir. 2011), in which the court ruled that the exception 
covered a decision to leave exercise equipment unattended, which allegedly caused an injury to a 
detainee who used equipment in an unsafe manner.  Requiring constant supervision of exercise 
equipment would make recreation programs for immigration detainees more expensive, either 
limiting their availability or curtailing other valuable programs.   
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ond problem but exacerbated the first.  The result has been a dilution 
of Bivens and causes of action under the FTCA.  A sliding scale ap-
proach redresses the balance, leaving discretion intact but encouraging 
a second look at heedless habits that do not serve enforcement goals. 
 
